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CHAPTER 5 
Corporations and Partnerships 
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN 
§5.I. Consolidation of corporations: Remedy of dissenting stock-
holders. The modern corporate world demands a procedure for 
merger and consolidation. Because the courts formerly held that such 
a step could only be taken by a unanimous vote of the stockholders, the 
problem of providing such a procedure by less than a unanimous vote 
was thrust upon the legislatures. In resolving it,! the legislatures 
have in turn handed an exceedingly complex problem of stock evalua-
tion back to the courts by requiring that those stockholders who voted 
against consolidation should receive payment for their shares from the 
corporation, but failing to stipulate precisely how the value of these 
shares should be determined. The Supreme Judicial Court squarely 
faced this and a number of other practical issues in Martignette v. 
Sagamore Manufacturing CO.2 
In the event that the corporation and the dissenting shareholders 
cannot agree as to the value of the shares, G.L., c. 156, §46E, by refer-
ence to Section 46, provides that " ... such value shall be ascertained 
by three disinterested persons, one of whom shall be named by the 
stockholder, another by the corporation and the third by the two thus 
chosen. The finding of the appraisers shall be final, and if their award 
is not paid by the corporation within thirty days after it is made, it 
may be recovered in contract by the stockholder from the corpora-
tion ... " In the Martignette case the plaintiffs voted their 564 
shares3 against consolidation, demanded payment for their shares, and, 
upon a disagreement with the corporation as to their value, appointed 
an appraiser, as did the corporation. The two appraise,·s, however, 
could not agree upon a third, and upon a bill brought by the plaintiffs 
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§5.1. 1 Massachusetts provided the procedure in C.L., c. 156, §46B, which requires 
a two-thirds vote for consolidation with another firm. 
2340 Mass. 136, 163 N.E.2d 9 (1959). 
3 Out of a total of 28,295 outstanding shares. 
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the court appointed a third appraiser, the parties stipulating that this 
was to have the same legal effect as though he had been named by the 
other two.4 
Making use of balance sheets, profit and loss statements, the dividend 
record, a breakdown of the inventory, and statements of the market 
value of the corporation's securities, and of uncollected receivables, a 
majority of the appraisers determined the value to be $145 per share, 
a figure that was affirmed by the Superior Court. The defendant 
appealed from that final decree arguing, inter alia, that it was bad in 
law in that the figure exceeded the shown market value of the shares. 
The defendant had introduced evidence of over-the-counter sales of 
648 shares at prices of $100 to $119 per share in the months immediately 
prior to the vote for consolidation. 
In first answering the plaintiff's contention that the finding of the 
appraisers was not reviewable by the Court in the absence of fraud, 
the Court held that the appraisal, although "final" (G.L., c. 156, §46), 
was subject to review for errors of law. The Court distinguished the 
Martignette case from those wherein the parties have agreed between 
themselves that they shall be paid what others determine they shall 
be paid,5 or to be bound by an award of arbitration.6 Here the parties 
have been forced into this position by the statute. Thus it follows 
that they should be paid what the statute means by "value," and it is 
the Court's function to review possible errors of law to see that there 
has been compliance with the statute.7 
The problem of valuation is difficult because the legislature has 
stipulated only that the "value" of the stock is to be paid the dissenters. 
Whether this is to be the market value, book value, or any of the 
myriad other methods of evaluating the worth of shares in a company 
is left to judicial ascertainment. The statutes of other states are 
equally unhelpful, specifying "value," 8 "fair value," 9 or "fair cash 
4 The failure of the Massachusetts statute to provide for authorization to the 
parties to make application to a court for appointment of appraisers in the event 
that one of the parties refuses to name an appraiser or the two appraisers named can· 
not agree on a third is one of the more obvious deficiencies in the statute. For a 
discussion of the practical difficulties facing corporate counsel in applying the statute, 
see Kaplan, Problems in the Acquisition of Shares of Dissenting Minorities, 34 
B-U.L. Rev. 291 (1954). 
5 Eliot v. Coulter, 322 Mass. 86, 76 N.E.2d 19 (1947); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Beth 
Israel Hospital Assn., 331 Mass. 177, 118 N.E.2d 79 (1954). 
6 Baldwin v. Moses, 319 Mass. 401, 66 N.E.2d 24 (1946). 
7 The opinion leaves open perplexing questions as to the scope of judicial review 
of the award made by the appraisers and the procedure for obtaining review. For 
example, to what extent are questions of admissibility of evidence open on review 
and by what procedure? Here again the oversimplified statute provides no guide. 
Where the statute provides for ultimate determination of value by the court the 
area of review is much broader. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, §262(e), (f) (1953). 
"Modern statutes tend to dispense with appointment by the parties and provide 
either for court appointment of an appraiser or appraisers, or for determination of 
value by the court itself." 2 Hornstein, Corporation Law and Practice §632 (1959). 
8 Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Vermont. 
9 Maryland, Rhode Island, Tennessee. 
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value." l{) A minority stipulate "market value." n It is arguable that 
where there is an established market that has been steady during 
normal times, the market price of the stock is as good an indication of 
its value as any other figure. And the market price is, after all, the 
usual measuring stick administered by the courts in other areas such 
as taxation, the settling of estates, and conversion. 12 However, as the 
Court pointed out in affirming the appraisal of $145, the very fact of 
the consolidation itself may have such an effect upon the highly fluid 
stock market that the market price might not be a true measure of 
value, and thus although it might be given considerable weight, the 
appraisers were justified in not confining themselves to it alone,13 
The Supreme Judicial Court has not only aligned itself with the 
majority of states on this point 14 but found precedent for its holding 
in a prior Massachusetts case that the defendants had hoped would be 
distinguished or overruled. Construing this statute in 1916, the Court 
said in Cole v. Wells:15 "It is obvious that 'the value of the stock' 
means not merely the market price if the stock is traded in by the 
public, but the intrinsic value, to determine which all the assets and 
liabilities must be ascertained." In accepting the rule of "intrinsic 
value," the Court admitted that the statement in the Cole case was 
not necessary to the decision in that case, no market for the stock 
having been shown. At the same time the Court expressly rejected 
the further dictum in Cole "that valuation ... is to be ascertained 
as if liquidation had been voted" and emphasized the importance of 
going-concern value. It may be fairly said that on the whole the 
Court is adopting the "investment value" theory of valuation, with 
discretion being given to the appraisers in the particular case "to 
determine the weight of the relevant factors." 16 
In addition to holding that unanimity of the appraisers was not 
required, the Court modified the finding of the Superior Court as to 
the date from which interest was payable to the dissenters. The 
10 Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Ohio, Virginia. 
n Alabama, California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania. 
12 "Market value" as reflected in sales over the counter is far less reliable as an 
indicator of value than the market price when the sales have been in considerable 
volume on a national stOCk exchange. Compare Application of Silverman, 282 App. 
Div. 252, 122 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dept. 1953) (stock in R. Hoe & Co., Inc.) with Appli-
cation of Deutschmann, 281 App. Div. 14, 116 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1st Dept. 1952) (stock 
in American Telephone & Telegraph Co.) 
13 The statutes of some states expressly exclude from the determination of value 
any appreciation or depreciation directly or indirectly resulting from the proposed 
merger or consolidation. See, e.g., N.Y. Stock Corporation Law §21. 
14 See as typical: Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71 
(1950); Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 178 N.E. 766 (1931); Roessler v. Security 
Savings & Loan Co., 147 Ohio St. 480, 72 N.E.2d 259 (1947). 
15 224 Mass. 504, 512-513, 113 N.E. 189, 191 (1916). 
16340 Mass. 136, 140, 163 N.E.2d 9, 13 (1959). This is the valuation theory applied 
by the Delaware courts, with considerable weight being given to net asset value and 
capitalization of earnings. Sporborg v. City Specialty Stores, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 560, 
123 A.2d 121 (1956). 
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plaintiff dissenters had argued that interest should be paid from 
August 10, 1956, the date of the vote for consolidation. The Superior 
Court had allowed interest from September 10, 1956, the date by which 
the dissenting shareholders had to make a written demand to the 
corporation for payment pursuant to c.L., c. 156, §46E. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that interest should be paid only from October 
22, 1958, which is thirty days after the appraisers' finding and the date 
on which the statute provides that the dissenters' contract right shall 
arise. 
The Court's refusal to award interest on the shares from the date of 
the vote for consolidation or from the date of demand for payment was 
based upon the conclusion that the dissenters continue as shareholders 
until the value of their shares is found by the appraisers. But the 
Court indicated an awareness that in at least some situations fairness 
might require that the dissenters be denied some of the rights of 
assenting shareholders. A distinction might be made, for example, 
between a right to stock dividends and cash dividends declared in the 
interval between demand for payment and the payment of the ap-
praisers' award,17 
§5.2. Damages for breach of director's duty of loyalty. In Ander-
son Corp. v. Blanch1 the Court was required to deal with the rather 
difficult problem of damages that arises when a director-officer violates 
his fiduciary duty by entering into competition with his own corpora-
tion. The defendant, Blanch, a director, treasurer, and general man-
ager of the plaintiff, became dissatisfied after he had sold his 50 percent 
share holdings to his fellow stockholders and proceeded to organize a 
new corporation to carryon the same line of manufacturing and to 
sell in the same market as the plaintiff. Not only did he arrange the 
organization of the new corporation but actively participated in plan-
ning and designing products for manufacture and obtaining space and 
equipment for it. His services to the plaintiff became affected by his 
disloyalty and his activities on behalf of the new corporation caused a 
loss to the plaintiff. In addition he acted in bad faith, according to the 
findings of the master, in ordering useless wire for the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff corporation was held entitled to recover damages in 
three respects: (1) the difference between the salary paid to the de-
fendant Blanch by the plaintiff from the time his allegedly disloyal 
acts began and the value of his services to the plaintiff during that 
period; (2) the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of Blanch's 
conduct; and (3) the loss sustained by the plaintiff on the purchase of 
the wire ordered by Blanch. 
The plaintiff seems to have pitched its case primarily in terms of 
breach of an employment contract rather than on the broader basis of 
17 This distinction is made in the Ohio statute, Ohio Rev. Code §1701.85(e) (1955). 
And see Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, §262(i) (1953). For a discussion of this problem, see 
Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L. 
Rev. 233, 251-258 (1931). 
§5.2. 1340 Mass. 43, 162 N.E.2d 825 (1959). 
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breach by a director-officer of his duty of loyalty. Frequently, the 
result from the standpoint of damages will be the same,2 but the 
duties of a director are not confined to the terms of an employment 
contract. His affirmative duty to protect the corporation requires 
something more than abstention from conduct .involving corruption, 
dishonesty, or bad faith.8 Quite properly, therefore, the Court recast 
the issue in terms of the defendant's failure to discharge his fiduciary 
duties "as a general corporate officer." 4 And although the Court 
refused to decree a complete forfeiture of the defendant's salary be-
cause of his breach of duty, it retained a flexible control over the 
matter of allowable compensation by reaffirming the case-by-case 
approach adopted in Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove.5 
It may be of some significance that the Court in its opinion made no 
reference to the well-known case of Lincoln Stores v. Grant,6 which 
involved the problem of competition by directors with their corpora-
tion in addition to the question of the appropriation by directors of a 
corporate opportunity. In Lincoln Stores the Court stated: "Directors 
or officers of a corporation are not, by reason of the fiduciary relation-
ship they bear toward the corporation, necessarily precluded from 
entering into an independent business in competition with it, but, in 
doing so, they must act in good faith." 7 This overly lax concept of 
fiduciary loyalty with its implied encouragement to conflicts of interest 
may be in the process of being quietly discarded. 
§5_3. Foreign corporations: Solicitation and other limited business 
activity as a basis for conferring jurisdicton. A perennial. and vexa-
tious problem in this Commonwealth for the last thirty-odd years has 
involved the extent to which a foreign corporation might engage in 
business activity within this state without subjecting itself to non-
domiciliary jurisdiction for the litigation of claims arising out of that 
activity. That the problem has arisen at all is somewhat anomalous 
in view of the all-embracing language of the applicable statute.1 The 
explanation lies in the fact that the statute has not always been judi-
cially accorded its literal construction. In Thurman v. Chicago, Mil-
2See, e.g., Duane·Jones Co. v. Burke, 806 N.Y. 172, 1I7 N.E.2d 287 (1954) (em-
ployees held liable for carrying out conspiracy to set up rival advertising agency and 
take over plaintiff's employees and customers). 
S Production Machinery Co. v. Howe, 827 Mass. 872, 99 N.E.2d 82 (1951); Globe 
Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas Be Electric Co., 224 N.Y. 488, 121 N .E. 878 (1918). 
4840 Mass. 48, 50, 162 N.E.2d 825, 880 (1959). 
«; 808 Mass. 1,20 N.E.2d 482 (1989). 
6809 Mass. 417, 84 N.E.2d 704 (1941). 
7809 Mass. at 428,84 N.E.2d at 707. For a similar statement, see Craig v. Graphic 
Arts Studio, Inc., 166 A.2d 444 (Del. Ch. 1960). Compare Hall v. Dekker, 45 Cal. App. 
2d 788, 1I5 P.2d 15 (1941). For critical comment on the statement quoted from Lin-
coln Stores v. Grant, see Lattin, Corporations 254 (1959). 
§5.8. 1 G.L., c. 228, §88, as amended by Acts of 1989, c. 451, §61, by reference to 
G.L., c. 228, §87, authorizes service of process on a foreign corporation if the corpora-
tion " ..• has a usual place of business in the commonwealth, or, with or without 
such usual place of business, is engaged in or soliciting business in the common· 
~ealth, permanently or temporarily ... " 
5
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waukee & St. Paul Ry. CO.,2 the Supreme Judicial Court, in interpreting 
an almost identical statute,S held that the mere solicitation of interstate 
business by a foreign corporation was insufficient to confer jurisdiction, 
despite the fact that the statute expressly authorized service of process 
when the corporation was soliciting business within the state. The 
decision there rested upon constitutional grounds, with the Court 
expressing the fear that such a statute, if interpreted to subject a 
corporation that was merely soliciting business in the state to the 
processes of the courts of that state, would be violative of due process.4 
Since then, however, the Supreme Court of the United States has 
upheld the constitutional validity of similar statutes.15 This would 
seem to remove any constitutional obstacle to giving the statute the 
full scope of its wording, but the rule that mere solicitation would not, 
without more, subject a foreign corporation to the forums of the state 
was apparently left undisturbed.6 In every instance in which a foreign 
corporation, served with process pursuant to G.L., c. 223, §§37, 38, 
defended on the ground of jurisdiction, the Supreme Judicial Court 
managed to find activity in addition to bare solicitation which validated 
the exercise of jurisdiction without requiring an upset of the holding 
in Thurman.? 
Massachusetts' exercise of jurisdiction was unsuccessfully challenged 
twice during the past year, once in a state tribunal and once in the 
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. In the 
former case, Hub Mail Advertising Service, Inc. v. Inter City Sales, 
Inc.,s the established pattern of finding activity in addition to solicita-
tion was adhered to in affirming the jurisdictional basis, while, on the 
other hand, the District Court in Radio Shack Corp. v. Lafayette Radio 
Electronics Corp.9 broke with this seeming tendency and concluded 
that the rule today in Massachusetts was that mere solicitation did 
2254 Mass. 569,151 N.E. 63 (1926). 
S G.L., c. 223, §38, stated, as does the current statute, that "In an action against 
a foreign corporation ... , which has a' usual place of business in the common· 
wealth, or, with or without such usual place of business, is engaged in or solicit· 
ing business in the commonwealth, permanently or temporarily service may be 
made ... " as provided for in G.L., c. 223, §37. 
4254 Mass. 569, 574,151 N.E. 63, 65 (1926). 
5 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 u.S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 
95 (1945). And see Perkins v. Benguit Consolidated Mining Co., 342 u.S. 437, 72 
Sup. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952). 
6 Cf. Jet Manufacturing Co. v. Sanford Ink Co., 330 Mass. 173, 112 N.E.2d 252 
(1953). 
7 Trojan Engineering Corp. v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 293 Mass. 377, 200 
N.E. 117 (1936) (management of finances and business policy); Wyshak v. Anaconda 
Copper Mining Co., 328 Mass. 219, 103 N.E.2d 230 (1952) (promotional work and 
investigation of complaints); Jet Manufacturing Co. v. Sanford Ink Co., 330 Mass. 173, 
112 N.E.2d 252 (1953) (investigation of complaints by a representative in the state 
empowered to do whatever was incidental to selling and fostering good relations). 
Compare Remington Arms Co. v. Lechmere Tire &: Sales Co., 339 Mass. 131, 158 
N .E.2d 134 (1959) (promotion of good will and investigation of complaints). 
8340 Mass. 8,162 N.E.2d 760 (1959). 
9182 F. Supp. 717 (D. Mass. 1960). 
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furnish a basis for jurisdiction. In Hub Mail the Court found the 
statute lO was satisfied on a showing that in the conduct of its activities 
in Massachusetts the foreign corporation engaged an employee, negoti-
ated and contracted and bought goods, made payments by check to 
creditors, and otherwise looked out for and defended its interests. In 
so doing, the Court reaffirmed the principles laid down in Wyshak v. 
Anaconda Copper Mining CO.11 by upholding jurisdiction where the 
evidence revealed solicitation plus additional activity. As before, it 
was not required to pass upon the exercise of jurisdiction based solely 
and exclusively upon solicitation. 
Shortly after the Hub Mail decision was handed down, the exact 
question which had evaded unequivocal resolution in the state courts 
was placed squarely before the Federal District Court of Massachusetts 
by the facts of the Radio Shack Corporation case. In that case one of 
the defendants, Lafayette Radio Electrical Corporation, was a New 
York corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and distrib-
uting electronic products. The other defendant, Lafayette Radio 
Corporation of Massachusetts, was a Massachusetts corporation all of 
whose stock was owned by the New York corporation. The Massachu-
setts corporation sold electronic products, some of which it obtained 
from the New York corporation, and also distributed flyers and cata-
logs, supplied by the New York corporation, which advertised and 
solicited business and which carried the names and addresses of both 
corporations as the soliciting firms. Evidence was introduced which 
justified the conclusion that a considerable amount of business carried 
on between the New York corporation and residents of Massachusetts 
was owing to the distribution of the catalogs and flyers throughout the 
state by the Massachusetts corporation. 
By service of process on both the general manager of the Massachu-
setts corporation and on the Massachusetts Commissioner of Corpora-
tions, the plaintiff corporation instituted suit joining both the Massa-
chusetts and New York corporations and alleging unfair competition 
and a cause of action under the Trademark Act of 1946. The defend-
ant New York corporation moved for dismissal on the ground that no 
jurisdiction over it could properly be asserted. 
The Court on these facts took the position that, through the agency 
of the Massachusetts corporation's distribution of flyers and catalogs, 
the New York corporation solicited Massachusetts business, and relied 
on Wyshak 12 in reaching the conclusion that solicitation alone was 
10 See note 1 supra. 
11328 Mass. 219, 103 N.E.2d 230 (1952). In the Hub Mail case the defendant 
urged that the rule in Thurman was applicable by analogy: if mere solicitation for 
sale is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, so too is solicitation for purchase. Brief 
for Inter City Sales, Inc., p. 10. 
12 The Court purported to quote from Wyshak as follows: "We perceive no reason 
why mere solicitation should be ... insufficient under the statute providing for 
service upon foreign corporations." But if the omitted words are supplied the sen-
tence takes on a different meaning: "We perceive no reason why mere solicitation 
should be sufficient to constitute having a usual place of business under the statute 
7
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sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It further concluded that service on 
the Massachusetts corporation's general manager was statutorily 
authorized,13 Thus, for the first time since the Thurman decision there 
was a judicial pronouncement giving effect to the letter of G.L., c. 223, 
§38,14 
The Court in Radio Shack Corporation took the opportunity to go 
one step further in applying this principle that solicitation of business 
in a state is, by itself, an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Another 
. sta~y method of initiating suit a[~n!t,"~_0!:'~~5~!E?r~_~i~n -dOing 
business wltfiiIrt1're Cbmfi'f6fiweaIili IS by service of process on the 
Commissio'ner of Corporations, pursuant to Sections 3 and 3A of G.L., 
c. 18l,15 These statutes, along with Sections 5 and 12 of G.L., c. 181,16 
were before the Supreme Judicial Court in 1959 in Remington Arms 
Co. v. Lechmere Tire and Sales CO.17 There the Court expressed 
reluctance, in the absence of any legislative action, to broaden the scope 
of Chapter 181 despite certain decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court which indicated that legislative power over foreign corporations 
engaged in interstate commerce need not have been so severely 
limited.1s As a result, the Remington decision held, in part, that 
Sections 3, 5, and 12 of G.L., c. 181, do not apply to foreign corpora-
tions engaged solely in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, the Federal 
District Court in Radio Shack Corporation read this part of the de-
cision as expressive of the state Court's willingness to distinguish Sec-
tion 3A of this chapter from Sections 3, 5, and 12 in the light of the 
Wyshak decision, and accordingly held that mere solicitation of busi-
ness by a foreign corporation was an adequate basis for service of 
process under G.L., c. 181, §3A. It may well be that the Federal District 
~ Court has read into Remington and Wyshak more than was intended 
and that the Thurman case, with its restricted view that mere solicita-
relating to trustee process but insufficient under the statute providing for service on 
foreign corporations." 328 Mass. at 223, 103 N.E.2d at 232. The Supreme Judicial 
Court concluded that the rule that solicitation of business without more is not suffi-
cient "should be the same under both statutes." 
13 C.L., c. 223, §37, as amended by Acts of 1945, c. 306, §1, outlines the manner in 
which a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation fulfilling the requirements 
of §38 is to be served. In part it provides that service may be made on an agent in 
charge of the corporation'S business. 
14 See note I supra. 
15 C.L., c. 181, §3, requires every foreign corporation doing business within the 
Commonwealth to appoint as its attorney for the service of process the Commissioner 
of Corporations. C.L., c. 181, §3A, provides that in the event of a failure to make 
the appointment as required in §3, the corporation will be deemed to have done so. 
16 C.L., c. 181, §5, provides: "Every foreign corporation of the classes described in 
section three, before transacting business in this commonwealth, shall, upon payment 
of the fee provided by section twenty-three, file ... a copy of its charter ... certi-
fied ... by-laws, and a certificate" of certain information as to the corporate offi-
cers, meetings, and stock. C.L., c. 181, §12, prescribes the filing of an annual certifi-
cate of condition for every foreign corporation, other than one which is required to 
make annual returns to the Department of Public Utilities. 
17339 Mass. 131, 158 N.E.2d 134 (1959). 
18 See cases cited in note 5 supra. 
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tion of business by a foreign corporation does not subject it to service 
of process, is still controlling. 
§5.4. Ultra vires and the doctrine of implied powers. In this 
Commonwealth a private corporation is authorized to undertake such 
activities as are incidental and auxiliary to its main business.1 Of 
late, privately owned utility companies, organized to manufacture and 
sell gas or electricity, have initiated a policy of retailing appliances 
energized by these fuels. In Long v. Brockton Taunton Gas Co.,2 the 
corporation's right so to do was challenged via a bill in equity to 
enjoin a private gas company from continuing to sell or rent gas 
heaters, stoves, and other appliances. The plaintiffs, minority stock-
holders in the corporation, claimed such activity was ultra vires under 
a corporate charter empowering the sale and manufacture of gas. On 
appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court ruling 
that these retail transactions were fairly incidental to the corporation'S 
main business, and thus within the scope of charter powers. 
In an earlier case, MacRae v. Selectmen of Concord} it was held 
that a municipality in the business of supplying electric energy did 
not possess incidental powers which would authorize the sale of 
electrical appliances under the then existing statute.4 The Court 
there distinguished between a municipality and a private corporation 
with reference to the incidental powers rule, but implied that the 
distribution of fuel is an activity entirely disparate from the sale of 
appliances. 5 The Long case allays any fear that this implication 
might be construed to mean that the retailing of appliances is not a 
power incidental to the distribution of gas or electricity, and the result 
reached in Long is in accord with other jurisdictions which have had 
occasion to pass judgment on the issue.6 
§5.5. Partnerships: Liability of a dormant partner for debts in· 
curred after dissolution. In an era when the corporation is so widely 
used as the legal form for business enterprises, cases involving partner-
ship law have come before the Supreme Judicial Court only infre-
quently. But partnership law is complex and when such cases do arise 
they pose difficult problems. In Warner v. Modano,l for example, the 
§5.4. 1 Teele v. Rockport Granite Co., 224 Mass. 20, 112 N.E. 497 (1916). 
21960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 847, 167 N.E.2d 615. 
3296 Mass. 394,6 N.E.2d 366 (1937). 
4 G.L., c. 164, §34. This was subesquentIy amended by Acts of 1937, c. 235, §l, 
which expressly gave to a municipality engaged in the business of distributing gas 
or electricity the authority to sell, at prevailing retail prices, appliances utilizing 
gas or electricity. 
5296 Mass. 394, 398, 6 N.E.2d 366, 368 (1937). For the same intimation see Opinion 
of the Justices, 300 Mass. 591, 593, 14 N.E.2d 392, 393 (1938). And in Lowell Gas Co. 
v. Dept. of Public Utilities, 324 Mass. 80, 99, 84 N.E.2d 811, 822 (1949), the opinion 
is expressed that "The sale and servicing of gas appliances constitute a separate 
business from the supplying of gas." 
6 See, for example, Capital Gas & Electric Co. v. Boynton, 137 Kan. 717, 22 P.2d 
958 (1933); Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 300 Pa. 577, 151 AtI. 344 
(1930); Malone v. Lancaster Gas Light & Fuel Co., 182 Pa. 309, 37 Atl. 932 (1897); 
State v. San Antonio Public Service Co., 69 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). 
§5.5. 1340 Mass. 439, 164 N.E.2d 904 (1960). 
9
Moynihan: Chapter 5: Corporations and Partnerships
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
§5.5 CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 65 
Court was required to consider the liability of a dormant partner for 
postdissolution debts under the complicated provisions of Section 35 
of the Uniform Partnership Act.2 
The case arose in the form of a suit by the assignee of six trade 
creditors to recover for goods sold and delivered to the "Napoli Super 
Market." Prior to June, 1953, the market had been operated by 
Modano and Acconcia as partners, but in that month Modano bought 
out Acconcia's interest and Acconcia retired from the firm. Thereupon 
one Beale, a physician, became a partner with Modano in the operation 
of the market, and this partnership continued until dissolved by 
written agreement in September, 1954. Beale was a secret and rel-
atively inactive partner. Modano filed a certificate under G.L., c. IlO, 
§5, stating that the business was being conducted by him. After the 
dissolution of the Beale-Modano partnership the latter continued to 
operate the market. Two of the six trade accounts were for goods 
sold and delivered during the existence of the Beale-Modano partner-
ship, and four of them were for merchandise supplied to the Napoli 
Market after Beale had retired from the firm. Suit was brought 
against both Beale and Modano, but the only issue was as to Beale's 
liability. 
The trial judge ruled that Beale was liable on all six accounts as 
though he were an actual member of the partnership under G.L., 
c. I08A, §16 (1) (a), because by reason of his words and conduct he had 
represented himself as a partner in the business in a public manner. It 
is apparent that the trial judge confused the status of a dormant partner 
with that of a partner by estoppel. Since it had been found as a fact 
that Beale had become an actual partner, the provisions of Section 16 
of the Uniform Partnership Act were not relevant to the case. That 
section deals exclusively with partnership by estoppel. Beale could not 
be simultaneously an actual partner and a partner by estoppel. Yet 
the Supreme Judicial Court also dealt with the question of Beale's 
liability as though Section 16 were pertinent to the issue. It held that 
Beale was not liable under Section 16 for the four debts contracted 
after dissolution because no representation had been made to the 
creditors that Beale was a partner. The Court could have disposed 
of the Section 16 problem by pointing out that Beale was not a partner 
by estoppeLS 
Since Beale was found to be an actual partner, he was clearly liable 
on the two trade accounts contracted during the continuance of the 
business, and the Court so ruled. The fact that he was a dormant, 
silent, or inactive partner would not relieve him from liability.4 
Whether he was liable for the four postdissolution debts depended on 
the application of Section 35 of the act to the facts found. That section 
2 G.L., c. 10SA. 
3 There was no finding that Beale after the dissolution agreement represented 
himself as a partner or consented to such representation. If he had done so, he 
would have become a partner by estoppel under Section 16 of the act. G.L., c. 108A, 
§35(4). 
4G.L., c.108A, §9; Crane, Partnership III (2d ed. 1952). 
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is the controlling statutory provision on the liability of a partner after 
dissolution, and the plaintiff properly relied upon it in the effort to 
reach Beale. Section 35 makes a distinction between active and dor-
mant partners with respect to liability on postdissolution transactions. 
A retiring active partner is personally liable on any transaction which 
would bind the partnership prior to dissolution if the other party to 
the transaction had extended credit to the firm prior to dissolution and 
had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution or even if such party 
had not so extended credit but had known of the partnership prior to 
dissolution, was without knowledge or notice of the dissolution, and 
the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in a local newspaper. 
But a dormant partner is liable on such transactions only to the extent 
of firm assets if he was unknown as a partner to the creditor and was " 
"so far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs that the business--j 
reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in any 
degree due to his connection with it." 5 
None of the postdissolution creditors knew of Beale's relationship 
to the business; therefore, the decisive issue was whether the business 
reputation of the firm was "in any degree" due to Beale's connection 
with it. The Court held that the qualification of "reasonableness" 
must be read into the statute and that the question to be determined 
was whether it could "reasonably" be concluded that there was a 
causal connection between Beale's participation in the business and 
the business reputation of the firm. On the evidence, Beale was not 
known as a partner in the business community, had never ordered 
merchandise, had not worked in the market nor directed the operations 
and did not keep its books. But there was also evidence that Beale 
was not completely inactive in the business; he engaged employees, 
appeared regularly to examine the books, purported to discharge the 
manager in a letter signed by him as "co-partner," and warned a sales-
man for a supplier not to accept an order from the manager. The 
Court conceded that some persons in the business community may have 
heard of Beale's connection with the business but held that on the 
evidence a ruling was required that the reputation of the market could 
not reasonably be found to have been in any degree due to his con-
nection with it. The final decree was ordered to be modified by 
limiting Beale's obligation to the two accounts for goods sold to the 
market while Beale was a partner.6 
When a question so difficult of factual ascertainment as "business 
reputation" and its sources is in issue, the matter of burden of proof 
may well be decisive. Yet it is not clear from the opinion whether the 
Court thought that this burden rested on the plaintiff or on Beale. 
5 G.L., c. 108A, §35(2)(b). See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 29 Harv. L. 
Rev. 158,291, 311 (1916). 
6 It would seem that more properly the decree should also have adjudged Beale 
liable on the four postdissolution accounts, with the liability to be satisfied only out 
of partnerShip assets. This would establish the right of the plaintiff to reach firm 
assets with respect to these accounts on an equal basis with firm creditors. Cf. G.L., 
c. 108A, §§35, 40. 
./ 
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Although it has been held elsewhere that a retiring active partner has 
the burden of proving that notice of dissolution was given to prior 
creditors,7 it does not necessarily follow that the same rule should be 
applied to retiring dormant partners. Where the retiring partner had 
been known and active in firm affairs, prior creditors are entitled to 
rely upon a continuance of the same state of affairs in the absence of 
knowledge or notice of dissolution. But where the retiring partner 
was generally unknown and inactive prior to dissolution, it would 
seem reasonable to cast upon the creditor the burden of establishing 
the necessary elements of an estoppel.8 
§5.6. Liability of a limited partner. Due to a lack of Massachusetts 
decisions, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Plasteel Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Helman,1 was forced to call on cases from other jurisdic-
tions in an effort to construe a section of the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act.2 The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, sued the de-
fendants for an unpaid balance for goods sold and delivered to them, 
aIid attempted to predicate liability upon Section 7 of the act, which 
provides: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general 
partner unless, in addition to tlie exercise of his rights and powers as a 
limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business." 
The limited partnership agreement in this case named a general 
partner, who contributed services but no cash and who was to receive 
an initial 10 percent of the net profits, and also named the defendants 
as limited partners, who were described as trustees of three trusts, with 
one trust contributing $100 and participating in 25 percent of the 
balance of the profits and with the remaining two trusts contributing 
$5000 each and each participating in 37 i percent of the balance of the 
profits. In addition the agreement named the father of the bene-
ficiaries of the first trust as general sales manager and authorized 
execution of various financial powers by the general partner only 
when he acted jointly with the sales manager. However, there was also 
evidence that the general partner could have discharged the sales 
manager at any time, thus leaving the general partner in sole control. 
The plaintiff appealed from an allowance by the District Court of 
a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the trustees of Trusts 2 
and 3, finding that they were only limited partners. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that their mere signing of the agreement pro· 
viding for such terminable joint action was not taking "part in the 
control of the business" within the meaning of Section 7 of the act. 
This decision follows cases in other states that have adopted the act 
7 Credit Bureaus of Merced County, Inc. v. Shipman, 167 Cal. App. 2d 673, 334 
P.2d 1036 (1959); Johnson Tire Co. v. Maddox, 188 Utah 626, 221 S.W.2d 948 (1949). 
8 Cf. Vogler v. Ingrao, 123 Cal. App. 2d 264, 266 P.2d 826 (1954) (postdissolution 
creditor seeking to hold liable retiring active partner has burden of proving he knew 
of existence of partnership prior to dissolution where he had not extended credit 
prior to dissolution). 
§5.6. 1271 F.2d 354 (1st Cir. 1959r 
2 G.L., c. 109, §7. 
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in liberally construing Section 7. Thus, it is not "control" where the 
limited partner gives his opinions and suggestions to the general 
partner, especially when they are sought by the latter,3 or if the limited 
partner is on the board of directors but the testimony shows that he 
never functioned as a director.4 The line of limited liability is 
crossed, however, when the signatures of the purported limited partners 
were necessary to the issuance of any checks and, indeed, where they 
could issue checks without the general partner's approvaI.5 Obviously 
the saving factor in the present case was the terminable quality of the 
sales manager's position. The court analogized it to a California 
case,6 wherein the limited partner was authorized to co-sign the checks, 
but they also could be signed without him. 
The court refrained from citing earlier Massachusetts decisions that 
applied statutes in force prior to the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act, pointing out that the very reason for the existence of the new act 
was to overcome the strict interpretations which were frustrating the 
purpose of statutory limited partnerships.7 These cases have been 
soundly condemned in that they had the effect of attaching the un-
limited liability of a general partner to the "limited" partner for the 
slightest deviation from the statutory norm.8 
Factually, the case presents an unusual but not unique combination 
of a limited partnership and a trust as a device for investment in a 
business enterprise with limited liability. Even under the liberal 
escape clause from unlimited liability, provided by Section 11 of the act 
for persons contributing capital in the erroneous belief that they are 
limited partners, the shadow of contingent unlimited liability over-
hangs the limited partner. The trust has been said to be "an insur-
mountable barrier" between creditors of the partnership and the trust 
beneficiaries.9 But the trustees themselves are limited partners and 
under Section 7 of the act become liable as general partners if they 
take part in the control of the business. At the District Court level the 
trustees in the Plasteel Products case unsuccessfully contended that the 
trust estates became limited partners .. The trial judge rejected this 
claim on the ground that a trust is not a legal entity and further held 
that the trustees of Trusts 2 and 3 became limited partners in their 
individual capacities. The Court of ,Appeals found it unnecessary to 
review this holding, but it would clearly seem to be in accordance with 
Massachusetts law.10 
3 Silvola v. Rowlettie, 129 Colo. 522,272 P.2d 287 (1954). 
4 Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950). 
5 Holzman v. De Escamilla, 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (l948). 
6 Grainger v. Antoyan, 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1947). 
7271 F.2d 354, 356 (1st Cir. 1959). See, e.g., Hagerty v. Foster, 103 Mass. 17 (1869). 
8 Gilman Paint &: Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951); Rathke 
v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950). 
9 Crehan v. Magargel,234 N.Y. 67, 136 N.E. 296 (1922). See Giles v. Vette. 263 
U.S. 553.44 Sup. Ct. 157.68 L. Ed. 441 (1923). 
10 Dolben v. Gleason. 292 Mass. 511. 198 N .E. 762 (1935); Larson v. Sylvester. 282 
Mass. 352,185 N.E. 44 (1933). 
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